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4Abstract
This paper employs a generational comparison to examine how 
increasing labor market informality has affected how poor households 
in Egypt gain access to and rely on social protection schemes. Using a 
qualitative approach rare in research on social protection, the analysis 
relies on a set of 53 in-depth interviews conducted in Cairo and rural 
areas of Qena governorate. The interview sample was structured to 
enable a comparison of social protection access among young (age 20 – 33) 
and older (age 50 – 65) adults, and among men and women. The results 
indicate that among the generation of Egyptians approaching retirement, 
the expansion of public employment and a policy allowing easy access 
to survivors’ benefits among female dependents served as important 
means of increasing social insurance coverage. However, many young 
households do not have even one member enrolled in the public pension 
system. Labor market instability and informality have also lowered the 
perceived value of social protection among this generation. In conclusion, 
the paper discusses five common points of vulnerability across the four 
groups studied: labor force discontinuity among workers in the private 
sector, women’s dependence on survivor benefits, low pension values, 
poor quality of and limited access to health insurance, and, finally, lack 
of awareness of social protection mechanisms and poor understanding of 
how they function. All of these factors may create significant barriers to 
social protection access among poor households, and must be addressed if 
coverage rates are to be extended, or even maintained, in the future. 
1. Introduction 
Researchers and practitioners have increasingly been turning to the 
social protection framework as an approach to poverty alleviation in 
the Global South. Moving beyond the concept of the social safety net 
that accompanied structural adjustment programs in the 1990s, social 
protection adopts a more integrated approach to poverty alleviation 
that focuses on reducing risk and vulnerability (Kabeer 2009). The social 
protection framework has thus developed along with increasing interest 
in the study of poverty dynamics, as well as non-monetary dimensions of 
poverty, including exclusion and insecurity (Norton et al. 2002; Barrientos 
et al. 2005; Barrientos and Hulme 2009). 
5Despite this growing interest in social protection, little qualitative 
research has directly addressed how citizens of developing countries view 
and access different social protection mechanisms. Social protection is 
more often brought into qualitative work at the conclusions stage, serving 
as a framework for policy recommendations resulting from studies that are 
focused on poverty dynamics (see, for example, Davis 2011).1 This paper 
aims to address this gap by questioning how poor households in Egypt 
access different social protection schemes and how they perceive the value 
of those schemes. It also aims to identify key vulnerabilities in terms of 
gaps in social protection access for different population groups. Egypt is 
in interesting case in which to examine such questions during a period 
of economic and political change, as it is a country with extensive legal 
social protection mechanisms, the efficacy of which have been challenged 
by economic liberalization and labor market informalization. Recent 
political change in Egypt has also stalled existing efforts to reform the 
social protection system, while at the same time creating new legislative 
openings in a variety of areas. 
The paper draws on 53 in-depth interviews conducted in a rural and 
an urban location. The qualitative fieldwork was structured to provide 
a comparison between the older generation of Egyptians approaching 
retirement and the younger generation of recent graduates that has faced 
a privatizing labor market. The findings point to several common sources 
of vulnerability across different generational and gender groups, including 
labor force discontinuity among workers in the private sector, a high level 
of dependence on survivor benefits among women, low pension values, and 
the poor quality of the public health insurance system. Finally, although 
trust in the public sector pension system was high, and the idea of formal 
social protection was valued in the abstract, low awareness of how Egypt’s 
social protection systems actually functioned was an important barrier to 
access among all groups. 
2. Background 
Research on access to different social protection schemes in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) has lagged behind other regions, notably 
Latin America and South Asia. However, there is a great need to address 
poverty and vulnerability in MENA given the difficult labor market 
conditions that have prevailed throughout the region over the past two 
1 An important exception is Goudge et al. (2009), who examine factors affecting access to publicly provided 
health care services in South Africa among households with at least one chronically ill member. 
6decades (see Moghadam 1998; Dhillon and Yousef, eds. 2009), and during 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring in particular. Egypt is no exception to 
these regional trends, and has struggled with high youth unemployment, 
growing informalization of the labor market, and low wage levels since 
the late 1990s (see Assaad, ed. 2009). The national economic slowdown 
following the January 25th, 2011 revolution, in combination with the large-
scale return of migrant laborers who have been affected by other conflicts 
in the region, has led to further concerns over Egypt’s long-term economic 
prospects and their implications for poverty.2 
For the purposes of this paper, social protection is defined following the 
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) rights-based approach, in which 
social protection is conceived of as a set of policies and programs that 
“protect against low or declining living standards arising out of a number 
of basic risks and needs” (van Ginneken 2003b, p. 11, cited in Barrientos 
and Hulme 2009). Specifically, social protection is designed to insure 
against vulnerability to sudden losses of income associated with events 
such as health crises, disability, old age, maternity, or unemployment (ILO 
2009). The life course perspective adopted in this paper is based on this 
conception of social protection as providing insurance against points in 
the individual life course and the family life cycle when populations are at 
their most vulnerable (Barrientos et al. 2005). 
The social protection system in Egypt 
Egypt, like many other countries in MENA, has an extensive social 
protection system in law. The ILO categorizes Egypt as having a “semi-
comprehensive” social security system that includes coverage in case of 
old age, sickness, maternity, employment injury, and unemployment, as 
well as survivor benefits (ILO 2010: 203). Social insurance coverage is 
mandatory for workers in the public and private sectors, as well as for the 
self-employed. For wage workers in the public and private sectors, total 
contribution rates for social insurance are high, reaching 41% of the basic 
wage and 25% of the variable wage (the latter constituting bonuses, profit 
shares and other forms of non-regular remuneration). These contributions 
are split between the worker (14% of the basic wage and 10% of the variable 
wage), the employer (26% of the basic wage and 15% of the variable wage) 
and the government (1% of the variable wage, in addition to making up for 
any budget deficits) (Helmy 2008).
2 Prior to the revolution, in 2005, the poverty rate in Egypt reached 19.6% with an additional 21.0% near poor. 
Combining the poor and near-poor categories approximates the commonly used $2 per day international 
poverty standard (World Bank 2007). 
7Workers who make social insurance contributions for a minimum of 
120 months are eligible for a pension at age 60, and those with 240 months 
of contributions are eligible for early retirement at any age. However, the 
value of this pension is calculated based on the salary level during the last 
two years of employment only.3 In the case of the death of a pensioner or 
an individual eligible for a pension, benefits may pass to the deceased’s 
eligible survivors. The pension value is divided between eligible survivors 
according to a complex legal schedule; those eligible to receive benefits 
include widows, a widower if disabled, dependent sons and brothers under 
age 21 (26 if a student), unmarried sisters and daughters regardless of age, 
and dependent parents (SSA 2011). 
Covered workers are also eligible to receive compensation in case 
of disability, workplace injury and unemployment (SSA 2011). Women 
covered under social insurance are also legally entitled to three months of 
paid maternity leave for up to three children (SSA 2011). In addition, under 
Egyptian labor law, women working in establishments with more than 
50 employees are also entitled to up to two years of unpaid childrearing 
leave per child.4 Publicly-provided health insurance is legally compulsory 
for certain groups, including formal sector workers and pensioners, and 
is provided through the Health Insurance Organization (HIO). HIO 
operates a national network of facilities through which it provides services 
to those covered by health insurance (Maeda and El Saharty 2008). 
Social insurance covering old age, disability and survivor benefits is 
also mandatory for the self-employed in Egypt (Helmy 2008). The self-
employed can self-declare their level of insurable income, with the monthly 
contribution set at 15% of the declared income. Pension eligibility is at 
age 65 with 120 months of contributions.5 A similar system exists to cover 
Egyptians working abroad, but for this group social insurance coverage is 
optional (Helmy 2008). 
Egypt also has several publicly-funded social assistance schemes, which 
are targeted primarily towards widows, divorcees, orphans, invalids and 
the aged. However, as discussed further below, social assistance programs 
do not reach the majority of Egypt’s poor, and for those who do receive 
assistance, the amounts are very small (Loewe 2004). 
3 Under certain circumstances, for private sector employees the pension may be calculated based on the five 
years of wages prior to the last two years before retirement. For public sector employees, the pension is 
always calculated based on the last two years (SSA 2011). 
4  Labor law Number 12 of 2003, available at http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/pdf/Book2.pdf
5  Law 108 of 1976.
8Coverage of the social protection system
The ILO (2009) has also noted that most countries in the MENA region 
lack a comprehensive, coordinated social protection policy, an assessment 
that applies well to Egypt despite its fairly extensive legal social protection 
system. Egypt’s social protection system suffers from lack of efficacy, 
particularly in terms of poor coordination between systems, the failure 
to reach many population groups in need, and the unequal distribution of 
benefits among groups that do receive them (Loewe 2004; World Bank 
2006). These weaknesses have contributed both to shaping the current 
distribution social protection coverage and to the challenges Egypt faces 
in maintaining or expanding coverage in the future. 
Although social assistance has come to play a particularly prominent 
role in discourse and practice as a means to extend social protection to 
the poorest populations in the Global South (ILO 2010; Barrientos 2011), 
in Egypt social insurance has thus far been a much more common means 
of accessing social protection. Among the current generation of older 
households in which the head is age 60 or above, 63.4% were receiving 
a public contributory (social insurance) pension as of 2006, whereas 
only 12.7% were receiving a public non-contributory (social assistance) 
pension. Receipt of non-contributory pensions is concentrated among 
female-headed households, of whom 15.6% were receiving a pension in 
2006, compared to 4.4% of male-headed households. Non-contributory 
pensions are also more prevalent in rural areas, where poverty rates are 
higher than in urban ones.6 However, overall the World Bank estimates that 
public social assistance reaches less than 12% of Egypt’s poor (2006: 35). 
The important role of social insurance in providing social protection 
coverage in Egypt is a result of public employment policies put in place 
during the early 1960s that guaranteed government jobs to all graduates of 
vocational secondary, vocational post-secondary, and university education. 
This policy led to a prominent role for the government in national 
employment, particularly among women; the public sector quickly came to 
define the standard for a family-friendly, socially acceptable job (Barsoum 
2004; Assaad 2007). As public sector employees enjoy a particularly 
privileged position in Egypt’s social protection system, receiving pension, 
health, injury, maternity and unemployment benefits (Loewe 2004), the 
expansion of public employment played a significant role in expanding 
social protection. However, in the early 1990s, Egypt began implementing 
a structural adjustment program that precipitated a significant decline in 
public sector hiring. Achieving full social protection coverage through the 
labor market – or even maintaining current levels of coverage – thus faces 
several challenges moving forward. 
6  Author’s calculations based on the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS).
9First, labor force participation among women in Egypt is low and, among 
some groups, declining. Only 26.9% of Egyptian women were engaged in 
market work in 2006. Of those, 45% were engaged in non-wage work, 
which typically takes place in a family setting and is unlikely to provide 
benefits (Assaad and El Hamidi 2009: 224, 227). Women have also been 
particularly hard-hit by the reduction in public sector hiring, and appear 
to be withdrawing from the labor force rather than accepting jobs in the 
private sector.  Employment-to-population ratios among women declined 
over the period from 1988 to 2006 for all levels of education for which 
the public employment guarantees used to apply (Assaad and El Hamidi 
2009: 234). This means that a large percentage of the female population 
in Egypt is not directly covered by contributory pensions, placing them in 
the more vulnerable position of reliance on social assistance, shared family 
benefits, or survivor benefits in order to access social protection. Although 
the assumption that women will gain access to social protection through 
extended family structures is built into many national social protection 
systems, this is not necessarily the ideal mechanism for reducing women’s 
vulnerability (Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer 2003). 
Second, the decline in public sector hiring has largely been made up 
for through growth in Egypt’s informal economy. The public sector shrank 
from 39 percent of total employment in 1998 to 30 percent in 2006. The 
private formal sector, while growing fairly rapidly since the late 1990s, has 
not been able to absorb the number of workers who were once tracked into 
government employment. During the same period, informal employment – 
defined as employment without a contract or social insurance registration 
– has thus increased from 57% of total employment in 1998 to 61% in 2006 
(Assaad 2009).7 Like many developing countries, Egypt is thus facing the 
prospect of stagnant and even declining social protection coverage (van 
Ginneken 2003a; Barrientos and Hulme 2009).  
The informalization of Egypt’s labor market has affected its younger 
generations in particular. With the public sector closed to most new labor 
market entrants, and the youth (age 15 – 29) unemployment rate reaching 
15.8% under a standard definition and 21.5% including the discouraged 
unemployed (Population Council 2010: 96), the informal sector has 
become a common path for labor market entry.  Whereas in the early 
1970s about 20% of workers started out in the informal sector, by 1998 this 
had risen to 69% (Moktar and Wahba 2002). Table 1 shows the percentage 
of those currently in the labor force that were enrolled in social insurance 
as of 2006 by age group. Among men, a consistent decline is observed 
from the oldest age group (50 – 59) to the youngest (25 – 29); among the 
7  Unfortunately, reliable period data are not available from earlier years. 
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latter, less than a third were covered by social insurance. Among women, 
social insurance enrollment declines from its peak in the 40 – 49 year old 
age group to a low of 36.9% among those 25 – 29.8 It is also notable that at 
across age groups, social insurance coverage is significantly lower among the 
rural population, declining to a low of 22.8% of rural workers age 25 – 29. 
Table 1: Percentage of current workers enrolled in social insurance, by age group, gender 
and residence (2006)
Male Female Urban Rural Total
Age Group
25-29 31.8 36.9 45.1 22.8 32.7
30-39 47.2 45.2 59.9 36.2 46.7
40-49 61.5 53.5 73.5 46.5 59.2
50-59 62.5 44.6 77.3 40.8 58.2
Total 40.6 38.7 56.2 28.4 40.2
Note: The age range was restricted to above 25 to avoid censoring due to education, and to below 60 because 
this is the mandatory retirement age for public sector workers. 
Source: Author›s calculations from the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey
These figures could indicate a life-cycle model in which workers start 
out in the informal sector and then move into formal employment as they 
gain experience. Based on research in Latin America, Maloney (1999; 2004) 
has suggested that the informal sector may serve as a ‘training ground’ 
for young workers. However, in the context of Egypt, existing evidence 
indicates that mobility out of the informal sector is low, particularly 
for the low-educated (Ahlburg and Amer 2003; Wahba 2009; Amer and 
Simmonet 2008). Among workers aged 20 – 50 engaged in informal private 
non-agricultural wage work in 1998, only 7.4% moved to formal private 
work by 2006 (Wahba 2009). There is also a strong gender dynamic to 
mobility out of informality; Wahba (2009) found that nearly 80% of those 
who successfully moved to the formal sector were male, while Amer and 
Simmonet (2008) find that most mobility experienced by young women 
in informal employment was through labor market exit.  This agrees 
with qualitative findings that poor conditions, lack of security, and lack 
of benefits are barriers to women’s participation in the private sector 
(Barsoum 2004; Barsoum et al. 2009). 
8 Among the youngest age group (25–29), it is likely that social insurance coverage rates are higher among 
women than among men because women are more likely to remain out of the labor force if they are unable 
to find a high quality job, which is widely perceived to mean formal, preferably public, employment (Bar-
soum 2004; Population Council 2010).  
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The potential implications of informalization for social protection 
access among Egypt’s younger generations are thus of considerable 
concern. Informal workers by definition lack contracts and social 
insurance, leaving them and their families without pensions in older age or 
in case of disability. Barring significant mobility into the formal sector or 
access to other forms of social protection, Egypt’s young generations seem 
likely to suffer from little income support in retirement. Most informal 
workers also lack paid leaves and health insurance, making them vulnerable 
to health shocks. According to the ILO, such “lack of protection against 
catastrophic health expenditure is one of the critical factors contributing 
to vulnerability and poverty” (2009: 6). In short, while Egypt, like many 
other countries in MENA, has an extensive social protection system 
on the books, the combination of economic restructuring and rapid 
demographic growth has strained these programs (World Bank 2006), 
leading to growing questions about the extent to which they are accessible 
to those who really need them. 
Do the poor value social protection? 
On the other hand, some international literature has argued that 
workers may not value social protection to the degree that researchers and 
policy makers tend to expect. Van Ginneken argues that many “workers 
outside the formal sector are not able or willing to contribute a relatively 
high percentage of their incomes to finance social security benefits that 
do not meet their priority needs” (2003a: 66). In other words, formal 
social protection, which aims to provide for future consumption during 
periods when individuals are unable to earn an income through the labor 
market, may not function well to cover the immediate consumption needs 
of the poor. Poor households may thus see little incentive to participate in 
social protection, i.e. to save part of today’s some income for the future, 
particularly for those living day-to-day (Norton et al. 2002). There is some 
support for such claims in Egypt; in a study of job quality among young 
female workers, Barsoum et al. (2009) found that some did not want social 
insurance primarily because this would deduct from their already low 
salaries. Poor understanding of how social protection systems work may 
also discourage participation (van Ginneken 2003a), as well as mistrust of 
the government that manages those schemes (Maloney 2004). 
Reviewing literature on the informal sector in Latin America, Maloney 
(2004) has also argued that participation in formal social protection 
schemes may in fact have low returns under certain conditions. First, the 
quality and reliability of public benefits may be quite low in some countries, 
reducing the incentive to pay contributions in order to get these benefits. In 
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the case of rural South Africa, Gouge et al. (2009) found that poor services 
and costs associated with accessing benefits (particularly transportation) 
reduced use of free health services. Burdensome bureaucratic procedures 
were also found to prevent some households from applying for forms of 
social assistance to which they were entitled. 
Second, the benefits of social protection programs may be shared 
within the household (e.g. in cases where health insurance enrollment is 
extended to dependents), reducing the incentive for multiple household 
members to pay contributions. Furthermore, poor enforcement of labor 
law in many countries means that private sector establishments have 
significant leeway in ‘choosing’ the extent and level of their participation 
in social protection schemes (Maloney 2004). In Egypt, for example, 
employers commonly under-report the salaries of their employees to the 
social insurance administration in order to reduce contribution payments. 
Employees, in turn, have little incentive to oppose this practice except 
during the last two years prior to retirement, as this is the only period in 
which their pension value is based (Loewe 2004). 
Finally, in a wide range of developing country contexts, social networks 
and transfers make up an extensive system of informal social protection on 
which the poor may rely more extensively than formal schemes (Morduch 
and Sharma 2002; Maloney 2004; Tesliuc and Lindert 2004; Goudge 
2009; Davis 2011). This appears to be true in MENA, in which the World 
Bank (2006: 35) states that the volume of informal and non-governmental 
(including religious) transfers far outweighs public social assistance in all 
countries for which evidence exists. In Egypt, a recent study conducted 
in Ismailia showed that intergenerational transfers between parents and 
children are extensive, with female family members of both generations 
more likely to be transfer recipients (Yount et al. 2012). The important 
role of informal community networks, and particularly rotating savings 
and credit associations (ROSCAs), in household saving and consumption 
has also been well noted in ethnographic literature (see, for example, 
Singerman 1995; Hoodfar 1997). 
It is difficult, however, to make general statements regarding the efficacy 
of informal safety nets relative to formal social protection mechanisms. 
Many of the same scholars who have pointed to the importance of such 
informal transfers have also argued that they are not always reliable 
(van Ginneken 2003a; Loewe 2004; Goudge et al. 2009), and that their 
efficacy as a safety net varies considerably across social contexts and 
groups (Morduch and Sharma 2002). Nevertheless, informal mechanisms 
certainly play an important role in complementing – or substituting for– 
formal social protection, and may well influence how poor households 
think about the value of such formal schemes. 
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3. Method
The analysis in this paper in based on in-depth interviews conducted 
in Cairo and rural Qena, a governorate in Upper Egypt, which is the 
poorest (World Bank 2007) and most conservative region of Egypt. The 
interview sample was structured to form a comparison between two 
generations: older adults at or approaching retirement age (50 – 65), who 
are of the generation that benefitted greatly from the expansion of public 
employment in the 1960s and 1970s, and young adults (age 20 – 33) who 
have entered the labor market during the period of public sector decline. 
This design allows for an analysis of how labor market informalization has 
affected access to social protection, as well as a comparison of how the 
generation with much closer proximity to old age and retirement views 
the importance of social protection relative to the younger generation. 
The study population was defined as the working poor, or what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘popular’ (sha’abi) classes in ethnographic 
literature on Egypt (Singerman 1995; Hoodfar 1997). This population was 
chosen because it is the socioeconomic class for whom the amounts of 
income typically distributed through social protection programs in Egypt 
– anywhere from 12 to 120 USD per month9 – may have a significant impact 
on household spending power. Given the lack of qualitative literature 
focused on social protection, an exploratory design was adopted in order 
to reach a range of respondents with different forms of access to social 
protection mechanisms. Interviewees were chosen based on a purposeful 
sampling technique, in which a set number of individuals who fit pre-
determined categories based on age, sex, labor force participation, and 
access to social insurance or social assistance were interviewed. Education 
level was not used as an additional sampling criterion because the criteria 
used already lead to a wide distribution in respondent characteristics 
within a fairly small sample. It is worth noting that due to this, the sample 
may be biased toward the more educated, because many of the labor force 
categories sampled (particularly those with social insurance) tend to be 
dominated by the more educated. 
Fourteen interviews were conducted with young adults (seven female, 
seven male), and 13 with older adults (seven female, six male) in Cairo. 
9 It is important to highlight here that the aim of this paper, as with most qualitative research, is not to make 
generalizable statements about social protection access at the population level, and it is therefore not 
necessary to have a large representative sample. Rather, the aim of this qualitative analysis is to illustrate 
the hows and whys of individual values and decision-making issues that are often difficult to address with 
quantitative data. Hence, in illustrating the challenges faced by some individuals and households in terms 
of accessing social protection, this study does not make the claim that these are problems common to the 
majority of Egyptian households, but points to issues that are worthy of further study for both academic and 
policy purposes.  
14
Thirteen interviews with young adults (seven female, six male) and 13 with 
older adults (seven female, six male) were conducted in rural Qena, for a total 
of 53 interviews. The distribution of the sample by location, generation, 
gender, and access to social protection is shown in Table 2. It is worth 
noting that considerable difficulty was met in identifying respondents of 
this socioeconomic background who were employed in the private sector 
with social protection (i.e. social insurance enrollment) among all groups 
except male youth in Cairo. For this reason, self-employed individuals who 
had enrolled themselves in social insurance were interviewed in place of 
protected private sector employees in the older adult and rural categories, 
and only one young woman in Cairo and one in Qena with protected 
private sector jobs were located for an interview. Respondents in Cairo 
were identified through a snowball sample starting from an interviewer 
who lived in a sha’abi neighborhood, and respondents from Qena were 
identified through the networks of a local NGO. 
Table 2: Distribution of the qualitative sample, by location, gender, generation and social 
protection status
Cairo Qena
Younger Generation Female Male Female Male
Public sector employee, social protection 1 1 2 2
Public sector employee, no social protection 1 0 2 0
Private sector employee or self-employed, with 
social protection
1 2 1 1
Private sector employee or self-employed, no 
social protection
1 3 0 2
Unemployed or out of labor force§ 3 1 2 1
Older Generation
Public sector employee, social protection*§ 3 2 2 2
Private sector employee or self-employed, no 
social protection
1 3 0 2
Self-employed, with social protection 0 1 1 2
Out of labor force§ 2 NA 2 NA
Recipient of social assistance pension** 1 NA 2 NA
Notes: * Either currently employed in the public sector or receiving a contributory pension.
**Due to the difficulty of locating the small population of men receiving a non-contributory pension, this group 
was excluded from the sample. 
§ At least one of the female respondents in this category was receiving survivorship benefits at the time of the 
interview. 
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Interviews covered the interviewee’s current and past employment 
conditions, including social insurance coverage and other employment-
related benefits such as health insurance. They also covered household 
access to pensions and other forms of social protection, expectations 
regarding retirement and old age support, generational comparisons 
regarding access to social protection for today’s youth versus their parents’ 
generation, and a discussion of how important the extension and reform of 
social protection programs should be for the post-January 25th revolution 
government. Additional questions on the choice of whether or not to work 
were included for women. The bulk of the fieldwork was conducted in June 
and July 2011, with some additional interviews conducted in November 
2011. All translations are the author’s.10
4. Results 
This section presents the results of the interviews according to the 
four generation/gender categories included in the study. For each group, 
broad common life trajectories in relation to the labor market and access 
to social protection mechanisms are discussed. The primary aim of the 
analysis was to identify key vulnerabilities faced by each generation/gender 
group, and the extent of their access to social protection mechanisms that 
could alleviate those vulnerabilities. Perceptions of the value of different 
forms of social protection are also addressed. The discussion focuses 
on social insurance, health insurance and non-contributory pensions 
(commonly known as Sadat and Mubarak pensions), as these are the three 
most widespread forms of social protection in Egypt, and were the mostly 
commonly accessed forms among the study population.11
10 Quotes have been lightly edited for readability. 
11 Interview respondents were also asked about unemployment benefits, maternity leave (for women), and 
aid from charities, religious organizations or other civil society. As noted above, there is a legal provision for 
unemployment benefits for certain categories of Egyptian workers. However, the requirements are quite 
restrictive (SSA 2011), and actual receipt of these benefits seems to be extremely rare. Those of the respon-
dents who had heard of the concept associated it with political calls post-January 25th to provide aid to 
Egypt’s unemployed youth. Many were adamant that at the current time such a thing existed only outside 
Egypt. Outside the public sector, maternity leave is rare, and only one female respondent in the younger 
generation had benefitted from it. None of the respondents said that they or any members of their house-
hold were currently benefitting from non-public forms of social assistance. 
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4.1 Older men 
The group of older men was split between two main life trajectories: 
public sector employment, and employment, or self-employment, in 
the informal economy. Among residents of Qena, the latter included 
agricultural work. Educational levels for those in the informal sector 
ranged from two-year technical post-secondary degrees to illiterate, 
whereas three of the four public sector employees had at least a secondary 
degree and one was an illiterate factory worker in Qena. 
Government employment provided clear advantages to the men of this 
generation in terms of stability and security, as well as access to social 
protection. They were “appointed” in the government sector shortly 
after finishing their education, and had remained in their jobs ever since. 
All had social insurance and health insurance. These and other benefits 
of government employment were widely acknowledged, and educated 
respondents in particular lamented the difficulty faced by their children’s 
generation in finding such jobs now that the public employment guarantees 
were no longer in effect. The public sector was a less vivid comparison 
point for the less educated, for whom opportunities in this sector have 
always been lower, yet several also noted its advantages. All but one agreed 
that employment opportunities for men had declined since they were 
young. 
Among the group that had not benefitted from public sector 
employment, access to social protection through contributory social 
insurance pensions was mixed, and none had health insurance. In the rural 
study site, where the private sector is under-developed and education 
levels among the older generation were low, the thought of enrolling in 
social insurance had clearly never occurred to several of the respondents, 
who neither understood the process nor had the income to pay the 
contributions.  The self-employed, “independent” workers who registered 
themselves with social insurance did so because they were told to when 
they went to get licenses for their work. They too had little understanding 
of the system, and were unsure at what level they were considered to be 
contributing, although they knew their monthly payment. 12 They were 
also unsure of what their eventual pension value would be, but did not 
expect much. Irregularity of contributions was also a problem among this 
group, whose incomes varied from month-to-month, particularly given 
their advanced age. At the time of the interview, a self-employer tile layer 
in Qena, age 61, said he was unable to work due to health conditions and 
12 Most of the self-employed interviewed through this project were making social insurance contributions at 
the lowest possible self-declared income category, with a monthly contribution of 7.5LE (approximately 
$1.25 at current exchange rates). 
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said he had not paid his social insurance contributions for over a year.  He 
would be financially reliant on his son until he reached the self-employed 
retirement age of 65, at which point he planned to rely on his pension. 
However, he seemed unaware that his failure to make his contributions 
during the intervening period could affect his pension eligibility. 
Labor force discontinuity was also a problem in terms of social 
protection access among the Cairo sample of informal sector workers; 
all three of those who were uninsured at the time of the interview had, 
at some point, been enrolled in the social insurance system but had 
not met the minimum 120 months of contributions to be eligible for a 
pension. Individuals are allowed to make up for any shortage in number of 
contributions by “buying” those contributions from social insurance,13 but 
these older workers faced challenges in coming up with such sums. Said 
one man, age 53, who had left a job with social insurance and then tried to 
reinvest in the system: 
I thought about completing the insurance the way it was, 
but I found they were telling me I don’t know how many 
percent for the period that I wasn’t paying [my contributions], 
so of course it’s not possible for me to go pay about six years 
[worth], pay all that time that passed, with a fine as well.
Another man, age 56, became self-employed after working at a barber 
shop for years where he was covered by social insurance. However, with 
his reduced income as an independent worker he was unable to cover both 
his contribution and what would have been his employer’s. Contributing 
to social insurance also became a low priority. As he said “all my attention 
is on feeding the kids.” 
Although many of the men of this generation did not have access to 
pensions, the abstract value of social insurance was recognized by all; 
when asked whether they thought it was better to put a portion of their 
salary into personal savings, a private pension fund or the public pension 
system, all respondents said public pensions were the best option. Private 
insurance is not well known in Egypt, and all said that it was not realistic 
to expect that they would save money to provide for a retirement given the 
financial pressures of supporting their households today. The disability and 
survivor benefits provided to families by the public pension system were 
also an important consideration for the more educated urban population. 
Thus, the low level of understanding of social insurance did not seem to 
translate into mistrust of the public system among this generation. 
13 Interview with a representative of the Social Insurance Administration, 25 June 2012. 
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One consistently noted problem with pensions, however, was their low 
value, which was widely said not to cover a household’s expenses. None 
of those who were receiving or expected to receive a pension planned to 
live on that income alone. As with those rural residents who did not have 
a pension, several of the older men in Qena were relying or expected to 
rely on their sons to make up for any household needs not covered by the 
pension. In this context, where extended family and multi-generational 
households are common and some households have agricultural land, 
such informal forms of social protection in old age were more prominent 
than in the urban study site. In Cairo, along with some of the other men 
in Qena, this generation planned to secure their old age through self-
employment or informal employment. The idea of starting a small business 
or “project” in older age was common, and those who were already self-
employed planned to continue working if they were able. Others were 
already working in second jobs to supplement their pensions, or had jobs 
lined up for when they retired.14 By definition, these jobs had to be in the 
informal sector as it is not possible for those taking a pension to register 
for social insurance coverage. For those with pensions, informal sector 
employment thus served as a complement, rather than a supplement, 
to social protection access. However, compared to those with no social 
protection, pensioned retirees acknowledged that they had an important 
degree of security. Said one retiree, 60, who had a car that he rented out as 
a form of income generation, on preferring the pension system over other 
forms of retirement support: 
Even though it’s not enough, you know it’s guaranteed, there’s something 
there at the end of the month, better than nothing. With independent 
work in Egypt, you can come to the end of the month and there’s nothing 
at all…or you could have to stay home, you get sick, or anything happens 
and you have nothing…there’s a big difference of course. 
4.2 Older women 
Older women also tended to follow one of two main life trajectories: 
public sector employment, or life as a housewife. However, as is common in 
Egypt, several of those who had spent most of their lives as housewives had 
also spent intermittent periods of time engaged in wage work or income-
generating activities, particularly in the rural study site. Most of these had 
engaged in petty trading, but one woman in Qena was currently working 
in her family business, a mill, and one woman in Cairo was working in a 
secretarial job. Both had re-entered the labor market within the last several 
years before the interview, once their children were at least in preparatory 
14 Egypt’s public sector has a mandatory retirement age of 60. 
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school. As expected, family reasons – including household responsibilities, 
childbearing and husband’s opposition – were the main reason for labor 
force discontinuity among the older women, whereas labor market factors 
were the main source of discontinuity among older men. Among this 
generation of women, as with the older men, the only individuals who 
had had steady employment since their youth were the public sector 
employees. All of these older, female public sector employees had at least a 
secondary degree. In Cairo, the educational level of housewives and those 
engaged in the informal economy ranged from illiterate to post-secondary 
vocational degrees. Among the housewives in Qena, none had completed 
primary school and the majority could not read or write. 
As with the older men, women of this generation engaged in public 
sector employment enjoyed a considerable degree of stability and 
privileged access to social protection relative to those who had never or 
inconsistently been in the labor market. They benefitted from the public 
sector’s generous maternity benefits, and although not all could afford 
to take the longer unpaid leave for childrearing, the three government 
employees who had children had all taken at least one three-month 
leave. The fourth woman had been able to take early retirement at age 
45 in order to care for her ailing husband. In addition to the other social 
protection benefits that all public sector employees enjoyed, the fact that 
the requirements of their family roles did not cause them to lose pension 
benefits was certainly a considerable advantage of public employment 
among this group. As with older men, the security of the public sector 
was highly valued by these women, and they too saw the decline of 
public sector hiring as a major social ill. Again, among the less educated 
population, particularly in Qena, the sense of decline over time was less 
linked to employment opportunities. 
Another major benefit of the expansion of public employment for this 
population of older women, regardless of their employment status, was 
the survivor benefits they inherited from husbands who had worked in the 
public sector. Although eligibility for survivor benefits was not among the 
sampling criteria, it was found that all of the older women in Cairo who 
were not receiving social assistance, and four of the five in Qena, were 
currently receiving or could expect to receive survivor benefits from their 
husband’s public sector pensions. For those who were themselves public 
sector employees, these survivor benefits served (or were expected to 
serve) as supplements to their own pensions. However, for those who were 
housewives or working in the informal sector, these survivors pensions 
were, or would be in the case of widowhood, their primary source of 
income. Although many of the women in this generation, and particularly 
those who were not public sector employees, also had a low understanding 
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of the social insurance system, the fact that pensions were inheritable by 
surviving widows and children was quite widely known. 
Survivor benefits were such an important source of income support for 
the older female respondents because, unlike the men of their generation, 
they felt they had few options for income generation in their old age. 
A combination of advanced age, health concerns, and social constraints 
played into this. The women without education largely saw that they did 
not have, and in fact had never really had, options for work in the wage 
market. This was compounded in some cases by family and community 
resistance to the idea of women’s work. In both study locations, even for 
those who were public sector employees, the idea of starting a “project,” as 
the men planned, was not an option they considered. Some women could 
expect to receive additional support from their grown children (primarily 
sons), although others still had dependent children who they were 
supporting from inherited pensions. Thus, as one 61-year old explained, 
“you live at the level of the money…you don’t spend beyond your means.” 
This is not to say that this group of older women was satisfied with 
pension levels, whether those were contributory, non-contributory, or 
survivor benefits. Particularly for those receiving only survivor benefits 
or non-contributory pensions it was clear that the amounts were not 
sufficient to keep the household out of poverty. Perhaps for this reason, 
inflation and the rising cost of living figured most prominently in most 
women’s comparisons of their youth and the current time. The perception 
that it had become much more difficult to provide for a family even on 
nominally larger sums of money was a much more vivid aspect of the 
perceived generational decline among this group than labor market factors. 
Although there is no doubt that informal transfers alleviated the 
situation of some of the female-headed households, several cases illustrated 
the argument that those in most need may have limited networks in terms 
of reaching better-off individuals able to give. For example, the Cairene 
woman, age 62, who was receiving a non-contributory pension received 
139LE (approximately $23) per month.15 She received occasional gifts of 
foodstuffs from neighbors as well as money from her sons, two of whom 
were self-employed carpenters and one of whom was a casual laborer (none 
registered with social insurance). But at the same time, she sometimes 
gave money to a daughter who had three children and whose husband was 
not always able to provide for the family’s needs. Thus, while there was 
a flow of goods and money within the extended family and sometimes 
from others, none were in a strong enough economic position to pull 
15 This respondent was the only one of the three receiving a non-contributory pension who started receiving 
the pension while married. The other two women from Qena both started receiving the pension after they 
were divorced. 
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the respondent – or the family – out of poverty. It was also a common 
perception among the respondents that non-contributory pensions were 
only for divorcees and widows with no family support, and there was a 
certain stigma attached to not being provided for fully by family networks, 
particularly among the Cairo residents. 
Still, despite the low amounts, the women of this generation valued the 
public pension system highly and, like the men, saw it as superior to any 
form of private saving for old age because it was something guaranteed. 
The same could not be said of the health insurance system, which had 
low value in the respondents’ eyes due to of the poor quality of service 
at the public facilities to which patients must go in order for the health 
insurance to cover their treatment:16  
Unfortunately, the illness I had, health insurance won’t cover 
the right treatment for it, because the health insurance 
covers a certain amount and the treatment was more than 
that amount, so they would give me something that wasn’t 
appropriate…so I went and bought it [the medicine] from 
outside – Public sector retiree (early retirement), age 58, Cairo
Health insurance is important but it’s not good here in my 
village, I for example, I would go to the health insurance 
[clinic] and every time they would say you’ll take an alternate 
[treatment], there isn’t this, there isn’t this – Public sector retiree, 
age 64, Qena
For this reason, most of those who had health insurance, either through 
employment or survivor benefits, did not use it. Notably, some of these 
same women said that their pension was not sufficient to cover their living 
costs specifically because of the health expenses they incurred going to 
other facilities. Unlike the respondent quoted above, the poor quality of 
the health insurance system even led some older women to discount the 
importance of having health insurance to begin with, as illustrated by this 
exchange with a 50-year-old housewife receiving survivor benefits: 
I: Did you get health insurance with the pension? 
R: I refused to enroll, I refused, even though I’m sick, I go 
to [another hospital]…my brother gets me the medicine, I just 
went and did an ear exam, he was the one who got me the 
16 The older male respondents also noted the poor quality of the health insurance, and also noted that they 
did not use their insurance, but the issue figured less prominently than in discussions with women. Access to 
health insurance was also less common among the older males, since many of the older women had health 
insurance through their survivor benefits. 
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medicine….health insurance isn’t good…..because they take a 
lot of money, from the one [female] who has a pension, they 
take a lot of money from her pension….they take 40LE per 
month whether she gets any treatment or not
I: So you don’t want health insurance at all? 
R: No, I go outside [the health insurance system], I don’t want it, 
I go elsewhere 
The public health insurance system was thus doing little to reduce 
vulnerability to large health care expenditures among this older population, 
who resorted to spending part of their already limited pensions on health 
care, or relying on family transfers to cover health expenses. 
 
4.3 Male youth
For male youth in both study locations, the stable life path of long-
term public sector employment followed by the older generation (who 
were of their fathers’ generation) was more of an ideal than a reality. This 
generation was significantly more educated than the older men; only one 
youth in Qena had less than a secondary education, and all of those in 
Cairo had at least a two-year post-secondary degree.17 Nearly all would 
have qualified for government jobs during their fathers’ time. Yet with 
the system of government hiring effectively closed, their employment 
experiences were more varied than the older generation’s and much less 
strictly divided between public and informal employment. All of these 
male youth said that opportunities for finding good quality jobs had 
declined significantly since their fathers’ time and were extremely limited 
for their generation. Facing the pressure of supporting young families or 
trying to save for marriage, salary and job security dominated this group’s 
thinking about quality employment, with social protection often a fairly 
distant consideration. 
The public sector was still something of a labor market option for these 
young men, but had lost some of its key benefits, including that of easy 
access to all graduates. In Qena, where all of the young men interviewed 
saw the public sector as the best form of employment, such positions were 
said to be very difficult to get, requiring connections or substantial bribes 
17 Educational attainment in Egypt has risen considerably over the course of these two generations. Whereas 
about 55% of men born between 1953 – 1962 (the older generation in this study) obtained less than a 
secondary education, among the 1983 – 1988 birth cohorts (near the ages of the younger generation in this 
study) this declined to 38%. Among women of the same generations, the corresponding figures are about 
72% and 41%, respectively (Sieverding 2011). Nevertheless, the sample of youth in this study may be biased 
toward the more educated due to the sampling criteria, as noted in the methods discussion. 
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to secure. Both of the two young men working in the public sector in this 
location got their jobs through the preferential hiring system for children 
of current government employees (abna a’mileen). Even then, one had been 
hired on a temporary contract and was only given a permanent position 
after the January 25th revolution during the brief wave of government 
efforts to give youth better access to the public sector. The young man 
in Cairo working for a public sector agency was similarly on a temporary 
contract and did not know whether he would be upgraded to a permanent 
position. For other male youth in Cairo, the advantages of government 
employment had declined to the point that several had left contract-based 
public sector jobs for the informal private sector. The key factor in this 
decision was the higher salary they were offered in the informal job. 
In Qena, those youth who had not secured public sector employment 
had either given up on or never really considered the idea of social 
insurance; as far as they were concerned, the formal private sector was 
non-existent. One said that he was not even aware you could get social 
insurance if you were not a government employee. The one young man 
who had social insurance through a means other than government 
employment was a 29-year-old shop owner who had insured himself and 
the shop. When asked why, he explained that he did not really understand 
the system, but one of the village elders had told him that this was the best 
thing for him to do, and had completed the paperwork for him and told 
him which contribution level was best. 
In Cairo, in contrast, most of the young men interviewed had had 
at least one job where they were covered by social insurance. However, 
discontinuity of employment, even more so than among the older male 
informal workers, was a major factor among this group. Most had worked 
multiple jobs since finishing their education, punctuated by periods of 
unemployment, in a continual search for a job that was better paid, more 
suited to their qualifications, and in which they were better treated. Youth 
were also willing to leave their current employment as soon as they found 
something better. As a result of this turnover, they did not necessarily 
think that they would benefit from the periods of employment during 
which they had contributed to the social insurance system. Even if one 
employer insured them, the next may well not, leading youth to expect 
that any social insurance contributions they did make would effectively 
be money lost. 
This instability of employment, including highly personalized 
relationships between employee and employer, dominated the Cairo 
youth’s perceptions of the private sector. Their feelings of insecurity also 
affected their bargaining position vis a vis their employers in terms of 
gaining access to social insurance through their work, and few seemed 
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willing to bring up the subject. One 30-year-old, who described six previous 
positions in the nine years since he had graduated with his B.A., described 
the situation in his current job in a restaurant: 
I: Your employer doesn’t insure anyone at the restaurant? 
R: Recently some people went and caused a problem with 
him, so the social insurance [inspector] came and filed a report 
and that kind of thing, so it looks like he’ll take two or three 
[employees] and insure them.
I: Not everyone? You didn’t negotiate with [the owner] to 
insure you? 
R: I...in terms of him [the owner]…the negative effects of 
the revolution are there, that the cafes and restaurants are 
just getting by…here the way it goes, they say ‘hey, there’s a 
revolution, I’m going to get rid of that guy I don’t like, there’s 
a revolution, let’s lower salaries’….
Under this situation, with his salary already reduced to about half, the 
young man was not willing to join his colleagues in their negotiation for 
social insurance. 
Another 33-year-old teacher worked for a private school that reported 
less than a quarter of his salary to social insurance. Although this young 
man was under the impression that he was paying both his share of the 
insurance contribution and his employer’s, or 40% of his reported salary,18 
he had not brought the issue up with the employer: 
I: So there weren’t any negotiations between you and your 
employer or the school administration, that they would 
increase your insurance [reported salary]? 
R: Not at all! When the social insurance [inspector] comes 
it’s like an exam, there’s this fright from the inspector, and 
they go around to some of the employees and choose some of 
them – and I’ve been one of them a couple of times: “You’ll be 
asked, are you insured? Yes, I’m insured” 
I: They [the inspectors] don’t ask how much [of the salary] is 
insured? 
R: No, no. Most of the time the inspector from the social 
insurance just goes to the school administration and everything 
is done [i.e. he is paid off]…..
18 It was not possible to verify this employee’s claim that his employer was deducting the entire 40% from his 
salary, but a quick calculation of his approximate contribution and reported salary suggested that this was 
not in fact the case. 
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Although he would have liked to have a larger portion of his salary 
reported, since it was a good salary the teacher was not willing to leave 
the job over this issue. Several of the young men interviewed, as well as 
some of the older adults in Cairo, also said that it was common practice in 
the private sector to have employees sign an undated official resignation 
(known as istima’ara sita or “Form 6”) at the same time that they signed 
work contracts and were registered with social insurance. In this manner, 
the employer effectively bypassed labor law clauses protecting employees 
from arbitrary dismissal at the same time that he formally registered the 
employee. 
For most of the youth, such concerns with job security and wages 
outweighed the issue of social protection. Yet when asked whether public 
social insurance, private pension funds, or personal savings were the best 
way to save for retirement, young men in both study locations, like the 
older generation, overwhelmingly said that public social insurance was the 
best option. They saw saving on their low salaries as nearly impossible, and 
mistrusted the idea of private pension funds, much like they mistrusted 
private sector employers. Said one youth in Qena, “I prefer the government, 
if it’s a private group the one responsible for the insurance may take the 
money and run. But with the government, the money is there.” Young men 
also said that government pensions would provide for their families in case 
of their death. 
Nevertheless, the desire for social insurance conflicted with the realities 
of the labor market and more immediate income needs, as illustrated by 
one 26-year-old worker in a print shop in Cairo: 
He [my employer] wanted to insure me, but I refused because 
it will deduct 14% from my salary. My base salary is 1000LE, 
so if he deducts 14% it will be 140LE, and those 140LE will 
make a difference for me – I am a man getting ready for 
marriage and those 140LE, if I went into a gameiya [ROSCA] 
with them they’ll make something…so it’s not the time for it 
[i.e. insurance]
When the same young man, later in the interview, said that social 
insurance was one of the benefits he would like to receive through his job, 
he explained the apparent contradiction in his refusal, “it’s not that I don’t 
want it [social insurance], of course I want something like that, but I won’t 
take from my salary and affect my [current] situation for insurance that I 
won’t take, or that I won’t see its benefit except in the far future.”
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In light of the reality that many were not insured – and also well aware 
of the fact that pension values are low – most of these young men expected 
to follow the model of the older generation and support themselves in 
old age through continued informal employment or self-employment. Yet 
their ideas of future support were vague, conditioned by uncertainty and 
low standards of living. Under the difficult economic conditions these 
young men faced, this uncertainty also surrounded their ideas of how their 
parents would be supported in their old age, as illustrated by this extended 
dialogue with a 29-year-old, married government employee in Qena: 
I: Your father, will your father’s pension be enough [to support 
the household]? 
R: I don’t know….his income will be average, they’ll take away 
the bonuses and allowances [when he retires]
I: How will they [your parents] provide for themselves? 
R: God will provide for them, God willing. 
I: Is it expected that you’ll help him? 
R: No, that was before. Now everyone goes along [spends] 
according to his situation. 
I: You yourself, when you retire, how will you spend on your 
family? 
R: The same thing, from the pension. 
I: Do you expect the pension will be enough? 
R: No…I could do a project, later, from the pension that I’ll 
take, from the end-of-service reward…I don’t really think of 
these things, I think day-by-day. 
I: Why do you think day-by-day? Why don’t you plan ahead? 
R: Like I told you, I spend everything I make, in this situation, 
with all my expenses….
I: Do you feel secure, because you have a [government] job? 
R: No I don’t feel secure, and the salary, it’s just barely enough. 
Several of the young men in Qena and Cairo were already in fact helping 
to provide for parents who were living with them in multi-generational 
households, although expectations for parental support were less 
prominent among the Cairo group, most of whose parents had access to a 
pension. Other young men felt they would be financially unable to provide 
much support to their parents; one young man in Qena acknowledged that 
while he should help his parents, his income was so stretched providing 
for his own children that he was not sure whether he would be able 
to do so. The restaurant employee in Cairo quoted above said that his 
parents were more often the ones helping to support him. Thus, while 
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there were certainly intergenerational transfers flowing both to and from 
this generation of young men, their overall feeling of economic insecurity 
contributed to considerable uncertainty over how either they or their 
parents would provide for their old age. 
4.4 Female youth 
For female youth, the stable path of government employment that 
women of the older generation (who were again also of their mothers’ 
generation) had followed was as distant a possibility as it was for the 
male youth. Whereas the older generation of women was divided largely 
between public sector employees and housewives, the younger women, 
like the younger men, therefore had more variable labor force experiences. 
Though generally split between those who worked in the informal sector 
and those who withdrew from the labor force, even this boundary was more 
blurred, as many of those out of the labor force were willing to work if they 
found jobs that met certain conditions. Like the male youth, this group of 
young women was considerably more educated than the older generation, 
with only one woman in Qena not having completed secondary school, 
and all of those in Cairo with at least a two-year post-secondary degree. 
Unlike the other groups in the study, education conditioned these young 
women’s views on change in labor force opportunities for women. All of 
the young women in Cairo said that work opportunities had been better 
for their mother’s generation, and those in Qena agreed as far as educated 
women were concerned. But, since many of their mothers had not been 
educated, they thought that they personally had better opportunities for 
work due to their educational credentials and greater social acceptance 
of women’s work in their villages. Nevertheless, the difficult conditions 
of the private sector labor market made all of these young women’s long-
term prospects for work quite uncertain. 
As expected, concerns over treatment at work from supervisors 
and colleagues, the appropriateness of the job for women, working 
hours, and distance from home dominated these young women’s ideas 
of what constituted quality employment. Salary also figured into their 
considerations, particularly among those in Cairo, several of whom felt 
that usual salary levels for the types of job available to them were simply 
not enough to make working worthwhile. However, benefits such as social 
and health insurance were rarely mentioned in young women’s descriptions 
of important working conditions. When asked why not, one 29-year-old 
woman in Cairo responded “I guess because I work in the private sector 
and I got used to the fact that these things aren’t available.” Similarly, a 
25-year-old teacher in Qena responded, “it’s not that these things are not 
important but it is just fairytale talk!” 
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In fact, for the young working women, social insurance, health insurance, 
maternity leave, and paid vacation or sick days were not always available 
even in the public sector. The teacher in Qena, for example, worked on a 
temporary basis in a public preparatory school for 199LE (approximately 
$33) per month.  She described her work conditions: 
We get fired [contract severed] for four months every year, so 
that they don›t have to pay us for the time when school is 
out, and also so that we don›t continue for five years with this 
scheme so they don›t have to hire us [with a contract]. Then 
they rehire us when school year begins. They deduct 2-3 LE 
for every day that I miss work. We are not even entitled to 
vacations, no insurance, and no pension. 
Another young woman in Qena worked in a nursery affiliated with a 
public school on a class-by-class basis, receiving a wage of 2LE per class, 
and one young woman in Cairo had an administrative job at a university 
where she was also paid by the day. At the time of the interview, she was 
unemployed during the summer vacation, waiting to see if she would be 
re-hired during the coming academic year. As with the male youth, these 
female youth said that obtaining a government job with a contract and 
benefits required connections (wasta) or a parent in the public sector who 
could get them hired through the children of employees scheme. 
Although most of the young women who had ever worked in the private 
sector had simply given up on – or never in fact thought about – the idea of 
employment benefits, the experiences of those who were enrolled in social 
insurance, or had the option to be enrolled, revealed a deep mistrust of 
private sector employers compounded by a poor understanding of how the 
social insurance system works. One 25-year-old woman in Qena, currently 
unemployed, had previously worked in a nursery. She said she had had 
the option to enroll in social insurance, but didn’t understand the system 
and wasn’t willing to part with the money for the contribution, which she 
thought were just deductions that she would not see again. Another 27-year-
old’s experience with her employer in Qena demonstrated both private 
sector evasion of social insurance laws and young women’s suspicion that 
they will never benefit from the contributions being deducted from them: 
The insurance should be 40% of the salary, and according to 
the law, the employee bears 14% of the cost and the employer 
26%. So there was a problem, the organization didn’t have 
the money to pay the 26% of the reported salary, so they said 
they’ll take from us the whole amount. So what would make 
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me pay half of my salary, a little bit less, for insurance? Which 
I may or may not take in the end [as a pension]? 
The organization eventually agreed to pay its part of the contribution, 
on a reported salary of 200LE per month, whereas the employee was 
actually making 750LE per month. She said she was not happy with 
this situation because this level of contribution would yield a very small 
pension, but at the same time would have preferred not to enroll in social 
insurance at all. She explained: 
I: So, you told me you were forced to enroll in social insurance? 
R: Yes, because the organization made me. 
I: But now you’re saying you want them to report your whole 
salary? 
R: Yes, if I’m going to have insurance, then it should be 
something good, something that we’ll take a pension at the 
end. But why bother for such a small value? 
Unlike this young woman and her colleagues, most young women 
were hesitant to negotiate or even open the topic of benefits with their 
employers. One 29-year-old in Cairo was also insured at a lower salary than 
she actually received, although she did not know at exactly how much, 
and was also under the impression that all 40% of the contribution was 
being deducted from her salary.19 She said she wished she had had health 
insurance to cover a recent pregnancy, but had never discussed the issue 
with her employer, a tourist company. As, she said, “you just sign [the 
contract] because there is no work…. I haven’t tried to do anything about 
the insurance, they just say ‘bring your papers for the social insurance.” 
Surprisingly, knowledge of social insurance was low even among those 
young women who had public sector benefits. None of the three young 
women with government contracts knew whether or not they were 
enrolled in social insurance. One young woman in Qena, age 22, who 
was a permanent public sector employee and therefore by definition had 
full benefits, explained why she didn’t find the idea of social insurance 
important and did not think she was enrolled: 
First of all, because we don’t understand it. We haven’t seen 
what social insurance is really, so because of this I even don’t 
participate, because I don’t know what social insurance is. 
Except for the term – I hear the term social insurance but I 
19 Again, this could not be verified, but a rough calculation suggested that it was not the case. 
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don’t know what it means. And I haven’t benefitted from it, I 
mean, if I have social insurance, me and my family, what will 
that look like? So I don’t care if I have it or not because I don’t 
understand it.
 
She had never asked about her benefits, and did not know that 
contributions for these benefits were being deducted from her salary, 
because she had never checked her employment conditions. Another young 
woman in Cairo, age 33 and working in the government on a temporary 
contract, said that deductions were made from her salary but she was not 
sure if she would get a pension: 
I: Do they deduct social insurance from your salary? 
R: Yes, they always deduct things. 
I: Do you know how much they deduct? 
R: No, I don’t know, I don’t have any information on what 
they deduct or not, they told us that we get a pension but 
there are people who say that those on contracts don’t get a 
pension after they finish, that that’s the difference between us 
and those who have permanent jobs, the pension.
I: You didn’t ask? 
R: No, I didn’t ask. But they [colleagues] say that I’ll get a 
pension, I asked them once when a big deduction was taken 
from my salary, and they said it’s a deduction for the pension. 
I’m not sure if that information was right or not. 
Awareness of social insurance and other forms of social protection 
was similarly low among those not working. Most of the young women, 
whether employed or not, saw health insurance and maternity leave as 
more important than social insurance in the abstract, as these forms of 
social protection addressed their and their children’s immediate needs. 
However, very few had ever had access to such benefits.20 Some young 
women also saw less reason to contribute to social insurance because they 
did not expect to be employed for long periods due to family demands, 
and consequently expected to lose any contributions paid. Egyptian law 
20 Among the younger women interviewed, only one, the 29-year-old employed in a private tourism company, 
had ever taken maternity leave. Her company granted her the legal three months with full pay, and she said 
that she took the first two without difficulty. However, the January 25th revolution then occurred, and when 
she went to pick up the check for the third month she was given only half her salary, with the justification 
that the revolution had caused financial problems for the company. She was then placed on five months 
of unpaid leave without her consent, and at the time of the interview was still waiting to see whether she 
could return to her job. 
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provides a provision for women who withdraw from the labor force due 
to marriage to withdraw their social insurance contributions, but young 
women were unaware of this.21 
Aside from general lack of knowledge, part of what contributed to 
young women’s lack of concern with social protection was the norm of 
male providership, which was particularly strong in Qena. This applied 
both in terms of the expectation that their brothers would bear primary 
responsibility for supporting aging parents if needed, and in the expectation 
that their husbands would be financially responsible for providing for their 
own households through retirement. To the extent that they could answer 
questions about how they would provide for themselves in the event of 
widowhood, most expected to rely on survivor benefits. In the face of the 
reality that many (potential) husbands today are not contributing to social 
insurance, they had little to say. As one young woman, age 26 and working 
in the informal sector, responded “I won’t have a pension, there isn’t any 
stability for me. I’ll live from my husband’s work or my husband’s pension, 
and if he doesn’t have, honestly I don’t know. There isn’t anything. There 
won’t be any security.” 
5. Discussion
This paper presents a comparative analysis of how four age/gender 
groups perceive of and access social protection in Egypt: older men and 
women age 50 – 65, and male and female youth aged 20 – 33. Though 
different issues in terms of access to social insurance, health insurance and 
non-contributory pensions were more prominent in discussions with each 
of the different groups, several common vulnerabilities emerged across 
generations and genders. These included labor force discontinuity among 
workers in the private sector, women’s dependence on survivor benefits, 
low pension values, and poor quality of and limited access to health 
insurance. Finally, lack of awareness of social protection mechanisms and 
poor understanding of how they function served as an important barrier 
to access among all groups. In this section, these sources of vulnerability 
are discussed and policy recommendations for addressing them are put 
forward. 
21 Interview with a representative from the Social Insurance Agency, 25 June 2012. There are also stricter con-
ditions for men to withdraw their social insurance contributions, including reaching retirement age without 
having made enough contributions, imprisonment, and emigration. Again, this was not something respon-
dents in this study seemed aware of. 
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1. Labor force discontinuity 
Those workers who were unable to secure permanent government or 
formal private sector jobs often experienced a considerable amount of job 
turnover in the informal sector. This was particularly true among young 
men. This group was still early on in their careers and had the chance, 
at least among those in Cairo, to eventually find a stable formal job and 
become eligible for a contributory pension. Yet until they felt they were 
in such a secure, life-long job, youth were ambivalent about formalization. 
Social insurance was a low priority in the difficult search for a good job, 
and unless they expected to stay in one place long-term, they did not 
necessarily see the sense in making social insurance contributions that 
might not yield a pension. Although quite rational in the immediate 
term, this meant that some were giving up the opportunity to make 
contributions that might in fact have helped them accumulate the 120 
months of contributions needed for pension eligibility. 
Part of what this suggests is that workers need better education on the 
eligibility requirements for receiving a contributory pension, including the 
120 month requirement and how periods of missed payments are dealt with. 
These issues of awareness will be discussed more below. However, broader 
reforms are also needed to encourage social insurance participation among 
informal workers and eliminate penalties for discontinuous enrollment in 
social insurance. A reform of the social insurance law (Law 135 of 2010) 
was in fact passed by the Egyptian parliament in 2010. This law included 
a reduction in the employee contribution level to 11% and eliminated a 
cap on pensionable salary, effectively lowering contribution levels for low-
earning workers and raising them for high-earning ones. Importantly, the 
law also included a minimum pension clause, which will make all citizens 
age 65 or older with no other form of support eligible for a pension equal to 
15% of the national average wage.22 This could provide an important safety 
net for older workers in the informal sector for whom it is already too 
late to become vested in the social insurance system. However, although 
Law 135 was scheduled to come into effect in January 2012, its status is 
currently unclear due to the aftermath of the January 25th, 2011 revolution. 
Addressing the status of this law and other reforms to the social insurance 
system should thus be on the agenda of the new government. 
22 For more information on Law 135, please see: http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_
update/2010-07/index.html#egypt and the ISSA’s Social Security Observer 13: http://news.issa.int/layout/
set/print/newsletter/newsletter_repository/observer/en/social_security_observer_13#5729
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2. Women’s dependence on survivor benefits 
Due to the low labor force participation rate, particularly in the formal 
sector, of Egyptian women, their individual access to contributory pensions 
is fairly low. Yet for the older women in this study, the provision for survivor 
benefits for widows meant that the expansion of public sector employment 
provided many with social protection through employed male relatives. 
The younger generation of women, who had even less personal access to 
formal public sector employment than the older generation, also expected 
to depend on such benefits if their husband was not alive to provide for 
the household. However, given the high level of informality among the 
generation of young men, barring significant formalization, these women 
may be left with no formal income support in case of widowhood.  
In order to provide social protection to women directly, rather 
than relying on the increasingly tenuous prospect of survivor benefits, 
efforts should be made to expand the reach of social assistance. The full 
implementation of the minimum pension clause in Law 135 could be an 
important step toward reducing vulnerability among older widows who 
do not have access to survivor benefits. However, additional expansions 
to the social assistance system are also important to reach women under 
age 65 in vulnerable households. Currently, non-contributory pensions are 
not widely received in Egypt, and were found to be somewhat stigmatized 
among the study population, particularly in Cairo, due to the perception 
that they are primarily for divorcees, or other women with no male provider 
(for more on gender, stigma and targeting, see Sabates-Wheeler and Kabeer 
2003). While social assistance should certainly continue to cover younger 
widows and divorcees of all ages, expanding its effective reach at least 
to other groups of non-elderly women might help de-stigmatize social 
assistance while reaching a greater percentage of the poor. An expansion 
of social assistance through the use of conditional cash transfer programs, 
which are currently being piloted on a small scale in Upper Egypt, should 
also be further explored.23 
3. Low pension values 
Among those men and women of the older generation who were receiv-
ing pensions, the value of their pensions was seen by most to be insuffi-
cient to support their households. Although sons have traditionally been 
the primary form of old age support in Egypt (Yount et al. 2012), and cer-
tainly continue to play an important role, the findings of this study suggest 
that in some poor households the younger generation may be too finan-
23 The CCT program is being piloted by the Ministry of Social Solidarity in collaboration with UNICEF and the 
American University in Cairo. See: http://www.aucegypt.edu/research/src/Pages/CCT.aspx
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cially stretched to provide significant support to their parents.24 Reliance 
on informal mechanisms to make up for insufficient pensions, or lack of 
pension access altogether, may thus still leave households quite vulnerable 
to unexpected circumstances or expenses. In this context, respondents 
did not think of informal networks as a substitute for formal social pro-
tection, but rather as a safety net to make up for income shortages after 
pensions were spent. 
Indeed, many pension values, and particularly non-contributory pen-
sions, are not sufficient to keep households above the poverty line. In or-
der not to further reduce incentives to participate in social insurance, re-
forms should be implemented to bring contributory pension values more 
in line with the cost of living. Again, this was an issue addressed in Law 
135 that should be further studied and acted upon by the new government. 
Bringing non-contributory pension levels up to the poverty line, if not 
above it, will require greater investment from the state. The adequacy of 
the proposed level of the minimum pension in Law 135 for keeping house-
holds out of poverty will also require study. 
4. Poor quality of and limited access to health insurance 
Another important element of vulnerability to unexpected life events 
among those interviewed in this study is the lack of access to quality 
health insurance. Access to health insurance at all was found to be limited 
to permanent or contracted public sector employees and those receiving 
survivor benefits. Most of the young households therefore had no access 
to health insurance, which several saw as a more important issue than 
access to social insurance due to their immediate need for health care for 
themselves and their young children. Among those older individuals who 
did have access to health insurance, the poor quality of service at public 
health insurance facilities was a consistent complaint, and led many to 
seek treatment in other facilities outside the health insurance system. 
With advancing age, these health care expenditures placed a considerable 
burden on the household. Further research focused specifically on the 
issue of health insurance access and quality, with the aim of identifying 
how coverage can be expanded and existing facilities improved, is greatly 
needed in this context. 
5. Lack of awareness
Finally, although in some contexts it has been suggested that mistrust 
of the government may discourage workers from participating in formal 
24 Yount et al. (2012) similarly find that older Egyptians in Ismailia more commonly made downward intergen-
erational transfers than received upward ones
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social protection schemes (Maloney 2004), this study suggests that in 
Egypt this is not the case. On the contrary, nearly all of those interviewed 
for the study, regardless of age, gender or rural/urban residence, saw the 
government as the most reliable and trustworthy institution for providing 
a retirement fund. The fact that respondents expressed their confidence in 
the government social insurance system shortly after the greatest political 
upheaval Egypt has experienced in decades, as well as during a time when 
accusations of corruption within the former regime were widespread, is 
even more striking. 
In contrast, many of the respondents expressed a deep mistrust 
of the private sector, and not without reason. As interviews with the 
young generation in particular demonstrated, violations of labor law are 
widespread, and reportedly included lack of contracts and social insurance 
registration, under-reporting of salaries to social insurance, attempts to 
pay employer’s social insurance contributions from employee’s salaries, 
arbitrary salary reductions, deductions for sick days, and requiring 
employees to sign undated official resignations, effectively forfeiting their 
rights in case of dismissal. Faced with this level of insecurity, and in the 
context of high unemployment, youth were reluctant to negotiate with 
their employers over any kind of benefits. 
Both youth and the older generation were also in a disadvantaged 
position because may did not know their labor rights in order to negotiate 
them. A significant number of respondents, particularly in the rural 
location and among women, were unconcerned with social insurance 
because they did not understand it. Even some of those who were enrolled 
in social insurance were unaware of their contribution levels, requirement 
for number of monthly contributions and that missed payments can be 
made up for, and what their eventual pension value might be – or even if 
they would get a pension. Perhaps most importantly, they did not ask. 
Building an environment in which workers, and particularly young 
workers, are able to access the employment-based social protection benefits 
to which they have a right is of course a complex issue that requires, among 
other things, effective enforcement of labor law. However, one fairly direct 
measure that should be undertaken immediately is awareness campaigns. 
Providing workers, and, importantly, women who are out of the labor 
force, information about different social protection mechanisms could at 
least bring them to the point of knowing what benefits they should be 
entitled to, and hopefully spread awareness of the importance of social 
protection.25 For the self-employed, accurate information about their 
25 Among older workers in the United States, for example, Liebman and Luttner (2010) find some evidence 
that fairly simple informational campaigns regarding social security can lead to changes in labor force be-
havior. 
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eligibility for social insurance and the different contribution levels might 
encourage enrollment. Providing information about social assistance 
programs and their eligibility criteria to targeted groups is also important 
as a means to reach the most vulnerable, who are likely to be out of the 
labor market. Egypt is currently in a phase in which information sharing 
and citizen’s rights have become more prominent issues than in any time 
in recent memory. This opportunity should be seized to address issues 
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